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Abstract
It is now widely accepted that environmental entanglement and the resulting deco-
herence processes play a crucial role in the quantum-to-classical transition and the
emergence of “classicality” from quantum mechanics. To this extent, decoherence is
often understood as signifying a break with the Copenhagen interpretation, and in
particular with Bohr’s view of the indispensability of classical concepts. This paper
analyzes the relationship between Bohr’s understanding of the quantum–classical
divide and his doctrine of classical concepts and the decoherence-based program
of emergent classicality. By drawing on Howard’s reconstruction of Bohr’s doctrine
of classical concepts, and by paying careful attention to a hitherto overlooked dis-
agreement between Heisenberg and Bohr in the 1930s about the placement of the
quantum–classical “cut,” we show that Bohr’s view of the quantum–classical di-
vide can be physically justified by appealing to decoherence. We also discuss early
anticipations of the role of the environment in the quantum–classical problem in
Heisenberg’s writings. Finally, we distinguish four different formulations of the doc-
trine of classical concepts in an effort to present a more nuanced assessment of the
relationship between Bohr’s views and decoherence that challenges oversimplified
statements frequently found in the literature.
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1 Introduction
Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics, first sketched in his Como lecture
of 1927 (Bohr, 1928) and subsequently developed in his papers in the late
1920s and 1930s, is characterized by two main features. The first feature is
the assumption that classical concepts are indispensable for describing the
results of experiments involving quantum phenomena, in spite of their limited
applicability. The second feature is the concept of complementarity, which
describes the need to use mutually exclusive experimental arrangements in the
use of classical concepts such as position and momentum (Camilleri, 2007).
While the notion of complementarity is by far the more prominent of the two,
as Howard (1994, p. 202) explains, “the doctrine of classical concepts turns
out to be more fundamental to Bohr’s philosophy of physics than are better-
known doctrines, like complementarity.” In perhaps his clearest expression of
the doctrine, Bohr argued:
It is decisive to recognize that, however far the phenomena transcend the
scope of classical physical explanation, the account of all evidence must be
expressed in classical terms. The argument is simply that by the word “ex-
periment” we refer to a situation where we can tell others what we have done
and what we have learned and that, therefore, the account of the experimen-
tal arrangement and of the results of the observations must be expressed
in unambiguous language with suitable application of the terminology of
classical physics (Bohr, 1949, p. 209).
Scholars have long pondered over precisely what Bohr meant by “classical
concepts” or why he felt they should play such a primary role in quantum
physics. Bohr’s doctrine was a controversial one and remains the subject of
much debate and disagreement to this day. Bohr believed quantum physics to
be the universally correct theory, which thus would in principle—i.e., given an
appropriate experimental arrangement—have to also apply to the description
of macroscopic measurement apparatuses and observers. However, as the pas-
sage above indicates, Bohr felt that the experimental setup must be described
in terms of classical physics, if it is to serve as a measuring instrument at
all. One is left with the impression from Bohr’s writings that the quantum–
classical divide is a necessary part of the epistemological structure of quantum
mechanics. This view finds expression in the works of physicists like Heisenberg
and Rosenfeld, who were deeply influenced by Bohr.
We may therefore raise two questions about the views of Bohr and his con-
temporaries, such as Heisenberg. First, what exactly was the meaning, jus-
tification, and location of the quantum–classical divide? Second, how were
transitions between the quantum and the classical realm, i.e., the “crossings”
of the quantum–classical boundary, understood and explained—in particular,
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in what sense and how may classicality arise from within quantum mechanics?
These questions lie at the heart of many interpretations of quantum mechan-
ics whose main goal is to solve the so-called measurement problem—a merely
historically motivated term that should be more appropriately subsumed un-
der the general heading of the problem of the quantum-to-classical transition.
Remarkably, recent developments in the study of decoherence (for reviews, see
Joos et al., 2003; Zurek, 2003; Schlosshauer, 2004, 2007) have shown that it is
possible to address this problem (at least partially) by realizing that all real-
istic quantum systems are inevitably coupled to their environment. Studies of
decoherence have shed new light on the emergence of classical structures from
within the quantum realm and have led to enormous progress in a quantitative
understanding of the quantum-to-classical transition.
The natural question is then to ask to what extent such a research program
may run counter to Bohr’s assumptions of intrinsic, underivable classical con-
cepts and of different, mutually contradictory descriptions as embraced by the
complementarity principle. Can fuzzily defined concepts such as measurement,
quantum–classical dualism, and complementarity be reduced to effective con-
cepts derivable in terms of unitarily evolving wave functions and the influence
of decoherence, and can they thus shown to be but superfluous semantic or
philosophical baggage? Needless to say, this is an extremely complex question
pertaining to many issues of both theory and interpretation.
Questions concerning the relationship between the decoherence approach and
Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics have been raised by a number of
physicists working on decoherence. However, there has been little serious and
nuanced investigation on this matter. For example, Zeh has contrasted the dy-
namical approach of decoherence with the “irrationalism” of the Copenhagen
school (Joos et al., 2003, p. 27). However, one may object that this charac-
terization perpetuates the familiar myth of the Copenhagen interpretation,
and in particular Bohr’s viewpoint, as entailing some kind of radical subjec-
tive idealism. It is our view that a deeper understanding of the relationship
between the views of Bohr and his followers and the program of decoherence
merits more careful historical and philosophical investigation.
This paper is organized as follows. Sec. 2 prepares the way by sketching
the relevant components of the problem of the quantum-to-classical transi-
tion (Sec. 2.1) and by providing a brief review of the decoherence program
(Sec. 2.2). In particular, we will discuss to what extent, and in what sense,
decoherence may be said to explain the emergence of classicality (Sec. 2.3).
Secs. 3 and 4 then examine relationships between the decoherence account of
the quantum-to-classical transition and Bohr’s doctrine of classical concepts,
in the following two ways.
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First, in Secs. 3.1 and 3.2, we will investigate the degree to which Bohr’s un-
derstanding of the quantum–classical divide may be recovered as emergent,
and how this may challenge or support both Bohr’s interpretation of quantum
mechanics and his intuition about such concepts. Inevitably, given the large
degree of scholarly dispute about the exact meaning of Bohr’s writings and
his views, this poses a difficult problem. Rather than take into account dif-
ferent possible readings of Bohr’s philosophy, we will focus specifically on his
view of the quantum–classical divide in the context of the interaction between
object and measuring apparatus, and the way it may differ crucially from
Heisenberg’s interpretation. A close examination of Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s
writings and correspondence in the 1930s reveals an underlying disagreement
on how the dividing line, or “cut,” is to be understood (Sec. 3.3). This point
has often gone unnoticed. We can gain a deeper insight into Bohr’s position,
and why he disagreed with Heisenberg on the cut, through Howard’s recon-
struction of Bohr’s doctrine of classical concepts (Sec. 3.4). This, in turn,
sheds new light on the points of convergence and divergence between Bohr
and the current decoherence-based program of emergent classicality. We will
also show (Sec. 3.5) how certain passages of Heisenberg’s writing point out the
importance of the openness of quantum systems in the problem of classicality.
Second, in Sec. 4 we look in more detail at the doctrine of classical concepts,
as it was understood by Bohr and his followers, in particular Heisenberg,
Weizsa¨cker, and Rosenfeld. While their views have often been taken as rep-
resentative of what is commonly called the “Copenhagen interpretation,” we
must be clear that as it is commonly used, this term refers to a range of dif-
ferent physical and philosophical perspectives which emerged in the decades
following the establishment of quantum mechanics in the late 1920s. 1 Indeed,
a close reading reveals that there is not one single version of Bohr’s “doctrine
of classical concepts” which emerges from the writings of the Copenhagen
school (Sec. 4.1). Here we will draw a distinction (Sec. 4.2) between those who
defended the view that we must use classical concepts in quantum mechanics
(Bohr) and those who took a more pragmatic position, in arguing that it is
simply the case that we do use classical concepts (Weizsa¨cker). A key to un-
derstanding the relationship between decoherence and the doctrine of classical
concepts is the distinction which can be drawn between an epistemological and
physical formulation formulation of the doctrine (Sec. 4.3). In Sec. 4.4 we shall
1 As Jammer points out in his Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics, “the Copenhagen
interpretation is not a single, clear-cut, unambiguously defined set of ideas but rather
a common denominator for a variety of related viewpoints. Nor is it necessarily
linked with a specific philosophical or ideological position” (Jammer, 1974, p. 87).
Indeed the very idea of a unitary interpretation only seems to have emerged in
the 1950s in the context of the challenge of Soviet Marxist critique of quantum
mechanics, and the defense of Bohr’s views, albeit from different epistemological
standpoints, by Heisenberg and Rosenfeld.
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discuss to what extent decoherence can be regarded as providing a physical
account of Bohr’s doctrine.
This paper avoids the tendency which has become customary in much of the
literature to compare the newly emerging ideas on the foundations of quantum
mechanics with some reconstructed, or worse still, some imagined, version of
the “Copenhagen interpretation.” Instead we focus on what Bohr had to say,
as well as on the writings of Heisenberg, Rosenfeld, and Weizsa¨cker. To what
extent their views are in stark contrast with Bohr’s interpretation or when
they represent an approach entirely consistent with his general viewpoint is
particularly relevant in the context of our discussion of decoherence. Decoher-
ence marks the most successful attempt of explaining the quantum-to-classical
transition wholly within the framework of quantum mechanics. But this can
be seen as part of a general approach which a number of Bohr’s followers—
notably Weizsa¨cker and Rosenfeld—began to pursue in the 1960s. Far from
seeing it as an invalidation of Bohr’s basic insight, they regarded it as pro-
viding a justification of his views. Of course, whether this was true to Bohr’s
original vision remains a point of some conjecture. However, it would be just as
premature and foolish to declare Bohr’s views (an interpretation of quantum
mechanics) as invalidated by decoherence (a consequence of quantum theory
and a physical process), as to deny that decoherence suggests a reconsider-
ation of the status of Bohr’s concepts. It is our hope that our investigation
will establish a more refined view on the complex connections between Bohr’s
views and those of his followers on the one hand, and the insights gathered
from decoherence and the related decoherence-inspired interpretive programs
on the other hand.
2 The quantum-to-classical transition and decoherence
In this section, we shall briefly review the problem of the quantum-to-classical
transition and the implications of decoherence for this problem. This will allow
us to clearly state the scope of decoherence as required for a careful comparison
with Bohr’s views on the quantum-to-classical transition. The basic formalism
of quantum measurement and decoherence will also be relevant to Howard’s
reconstruction of Bohr’s doctrine of classical concepts discussed in Sec. 3.4
below.
2.1 The problem of the quantum-to-classical transition in quantum mechanics
Broadly speaking, the problem of the quantum-to-classical transition is con-
cerned with the difficulty of how to reconcile the quantum-mechanical descrip-
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tion of systems by unitarily evolving wave functions—which may, for example,
describe coherent superpositions of macroscopically distinguishable states—
with the fact that objects in the macroscopic world are perceived to be in
well-defined, robust “classical” states and not in superpositions thereof. Specif-
ically, we may distinguish three related but distinct problems (Schlosshauer,
2007):
(1) Preferred-basis problem. What singles out the set of “preferred” physical
quantities in nature? For example, why do we observe macroscopic sys-
tems to be in definite positions rather than in superpositions of positions?
(2) Nonobservability of interferences. Why is it so prohibitively difficult to
observe interference effects, in particular on macroscopic scales?
(3) Problem of outcomes. How can we explain the apparent probabilistic se-
lection of definite outcomes in measurements?
A fourth aspect is the apparent insensitivity of macroscopic systems to mea-
surements: Measurements on closed quantum systems usually alter the state
of the system, posing the question of how states become “objectified” in the
sense of classical physics.
The problem of the quantum-to-classical transition is often illustrated in the
context of the von Neumann measurement scheme (von Neumann, 1932),
which demonstrates how microscopic (and thus “unproblematic”) superpo-
sitions are readily amplified to the macroscopic realm. Here one considers in-
teractions of a quantum system S with an apparatus A which is also treated
quantum-mechanically. Suppose the apparatus measures a set of states {|sn〉}
of the system in the sense that the system–apparatus interaction is of the form
|sn〉|a0〉
t
−→ |sn〉|an〉, where |a0〉 is the initial “ready” state of the apparatus.
The linearity of the Schro¨dinger equation then implies that the tensor-product
state of an arbitrary initial state
∑
n cn|sn〉 of the system and the initial ap-
paratus state |a0〉 will evolve into a composite entangled state according to(∑
n
cn|sn〉
)
|a0〉
t
−→
∑
n
cn|sn〉|an〉. (1)
Evidently, measurement in this sense amounts to the creation of quantum
correlations between the system and the apparatus. No individual state vector
can be assigned to either the system or the apparatus at the conclusion of the
interaction. All aspects of the problem of the quantum-to-classical transition
listed above appear here: In general the final state on the right-hand side of
Eq. (1) can be rewritten in different bases; it should be possible to measure
interference between different “pointer” positions of the apparatus; and no one
outcome (or pointer position “n”) has been singled out. Inclusion of further
systems, such as a secondary apparatus or human observer, will not terminate
the resulting von Neumann chain if these systems are treated in the same
way as before (i.e., as interacting quantum systems with globally unitary time
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evolution), as already recognized by Bohr (1928) and von Neumann (1932)
themselves.
2.2 Basics of decoherence
The origins of the decoherence program can be traced back to a paper of Zeh
(1970) who emphasized that realistic macroscopic quantum systems are never
closed. If the Schro¨dinger equation is assumed to be universally valid, Zeh
then showed that such systems must become strongly entangled with their
environments, leading to a “dynamical decoupling” of wave-function compo-
nents and the inability of describing the evolution of the system alone by
the Schro¨dinger equation. Zeh proposed that this mechanism could help ex-
plain the observed fragility of quantum states of macroscopic systems and the
emergence of effective superselection rules. Zeh’s work, although supported
by Wigner 2 , remained in relative obscurity for the better part of the next
decade. Zeh (2006) recently called this period the “dark ages of decoherence.”
In the 1980s, crucial progress was made through contributions by Zurek (1981,
1982), who also played an important role in popularizing decoherence through
an article published in Physics Today (Zurek, 1991).
Since then decoherence has evolved into an exponentially growing field of
research that has attracted massive attention from the foundational, theo-
retical, and experimental communities. Decoherence is a consequence of a
realistic application of standard quantum mechanics and is an experimen-
tally well-confirmed physical process. It is therefore neither an interpretation
nor a modification of quantum mechanics. However, the implications of de-
coherence are intimately related to interpretive issues of quantum mechan-
ics (Schlosshauer, 2004), in particular to the problem of measurement. Bub
(1997) even suggested that decoherence represents the “new orthodoxy” of
understanding quantum mechanics, i.e., as the working physicist’s approach
to motivating the postulates of quantum mechanics from physical principles.
We shall now briefly summarize the formalism and physical mechanism of de-
coherence (for in-depth reviews of the field, see Joos et al., 2003; Zurek, 2003;
Schlosshauer, 2004, 2007). Readers familiar with decoherence may choose to
skip ahead to Sec. 3. We may define decoherence as the practically irreversible
dislocalization (in Hilbert space) of superpositions due to ubiquitous entan-
glement with the environment. The key insight is that every realistic quantum
system is open, i.e., interacts with its environment, and that such interactions
lead to entanglement between the two partners. This means that there exists
2 In fact, Wigner abandoned his views on the special role of consciousness in quan-
tum measurement (Wigner, 1961) once he became aware of Zeh’s ideas on decoher-
ence (Wigner, 1995, pp. 66, 75, 215–6, 334, 338, 341, 583, 606, 615).
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no longer a quantum state vector that could be attributed to the system alone.
In its most basic form, the process of decoherence can be described as a von
Neumann measurement of the system by its environment,
(∑
n
cn|sn〉
)
|E0〉
t
−→ |Ψ(t)〉 =
∑
n
cn|sn〉|En(t)〉. (2)
The superposition initially confined to the system has now spread to the larger,
composite system–environment state. Coherence between the components |s1〉
can no longer be considered a property of the system alone. Since we have in
practice rarely access to all environmental degrees of freedom, this process
is irreversible for all practical purposes. 3 The particular basis of the system
in which the von Neumann measurement happens is determined by the rele-
vant Hamiltonians, typically the system–environment interaction Hamiltonian
(“environment-induced superselection”; Zurek, 1981, 1982).
Suppose now we inquire about the consequences of the environmental interac-
tions for future measurements on the system. The local measurement statistics
are exhaustively contained in the reduced density matrix (Landau, 1927; von
Neumann, 1932; Furry, 1936) for the system, obtained by tracing over the
environmental degrees of freedom,
ρˆS(t) = TrE |Ψ(t)〉〈Ψ(t)| =
∑
n
cmc
∗
n
|sm〉〈sn|〈En(t)|Em(t)〉. (3)
The presence of interference terms m 6= n embodies the quantum coherence
between the different components |sn〉|En(t)〉. Concrete models for the envi-
ronment show that, with respect to the basis {|sn〉} of the system, the corre-
sponding “relative” states (Everett, 1957) |En(t)〉 of the environment become
rapidly orthogonal, meaning that they are able to resolve the differences be-
tween the states |sn〉 (similar to a “pointer” on a scale).
Then the reduced density matrix (3) will become rapidly orthogonal in the pre-
ferred “pointer” basis {|sn〉} dynamically selected by the system–environment
interaction Hamiltonian (Zurek, 1981, 1982),
ρˆS(t) −→
∑
n
|cn|
2 |sn〉〈sn|. (4)
An observer of the system cannot measure interference effects in this basis and
therefore cannot empirically confirm the presence of the superposition. How-
ever, it is important to bear in mind that in the global system–environment
state the superposition is of course still present, or as Joos and Zeh (1985,
p. 224) put it, “the interference terms still exist, but they are not there.” Thus
3 In fact, such effective irreversibility is a necessary condition for Eq. (2) to count
as a real, measurement-like decoherence process—otherwise it would be merely a
case of “virtual” decoherence (see, e.g., Schlosshauer, 2007, Sect. 2.13).
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in principle a suitable measurement (albeit in practice usually prohibitively
difficult to implement) could always confirm the existence of the global super-
position: No single outcome |sn〉 is selected, as required by the unitarity of the
global evolution.
The environment-superselected states {|sn〉} are also robust in the sense that
they become least entangled with the environment, whereas superpositions of
these states are rapidly decohered. In this way, the familiar observables such
as position, momentum, and spin are dynamically superselected through the
physical structure of the system–environment interaction. Recent related re-
search programs based on studies of further consequences of environmental
entanglement, such as quantum Darwinism and redundant environmental en-
coding, have shown how observers can indirectly gather information about the
system without disturbing its state (see, e.g, Blume-Kohout and Zurek, 2006,
and references therein).
2.3 Emergence of classicality through decoherence
To what extent decoherence explains the emergence of classical structures and
properties from within quantum mechanics depends to a significant degree on
the specific axiomatic and interpretive framework of quantum mechanics that
one adopts (Schlosshauer, 2004). Since we are chiefly interested in the con-
sequences of decoherence for observers and measurements, matters are most
clear-cut if we assume the usual measurement postulates of quantum me-
chanics (i.e., the projection postulate with Born’s rule). In this case the use
of reduced density matrices poses no further interpretive difficulties, and de-
coherence resolves the preferred-basis problem and explains the difficulty of
observing most interference phenomena. Although the problem of outcomes is
absent by assumption, decoherence allows us to quantify when it is appropriate
to assume that an event or outcome has happened for all practical purposes.
One may go beyond the measurement axioms and use decoherence to show how
the projection postulate may be effectively derived from the influence of deco-
herence in local measurement-like interactions. Decoherence leads to effective
ensembles of quasiclassical wave-function “trajectories”—in phase space (Paz
et al., 1993) or other bases—which can be re-identified over time and may then
be associated with observed trajectories. In this way, classical structures and
dynamics may be understood as emergent, at the level of intrinsically local
observers, from a global wave function (Zeh, 1970, 1973, 2000; Zurek, 1998,
2005; Schlosshauer, 2006, 2007). The key interpretive difficulty concerns the
question of how to reconcile the fact that the global quantum state contains
all possible trajectories (outcomes) while only a single trajectory is observed. 4
4 To resolve this problem, one may have to resort to many-worlds and many-minds
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We shall not further concern ourselves with these interpretive questions but
rather concisely summarize, in the most interpretation-neutral manner pos-
sible, in what sense decoherence can be said to account for the emergence
of “classicality.” Decoherence leads to the dynamical superselection, within
the quantum formalism, of certain preferred observables that correspond to
the familiar quantities of our experience (such as position and momentum).
Decoherence causes coherences between the preferred states to become effec-
tively uncontrollable and unobservable at the level of the system in the sense
that phase relations are dislocalized into the composite system–environment
state. 5 Decoherence thus accounts for classicality in so far as it describes ef-
fective restrictions on the superposition principle for subsystems interacting
with other systems described by a larger composite Hilbert space. Save for
the fundamental problem of outcomes, this arguably explains how to reconcile
our experience of robust, seemingly measurement-independent states charac-
terized by a small set of definite physical quantities with the fact that the
linear Hilbert-space formalism seems to theoretically admit a vast number of
never-observed quantum states.
3 Bohr and Heisenberg on the quantum–classical divide
3.1 Bohr and the quantum–classical divide
Much has been made of the fact that Bohr’s epistemological approach to quan-
tum mechanics was opposed to von Neumann’s formal measurement scheme in
which these systems were treated as unitarily evolving and interacting quan-
tum systems, i.e., on an equal footing with microscopic systems. For Bohr,
quantum mechanics, as a universally valid theory, certainly could be employed
to describe the interaction of the system under investigation and the measur-
ing instrument, but in doing so one was precluded from treating the measuring
instrument as a measuring instrument. To this extent Bohr’s approach was
fundamentally different to that of von Neumann, taking the “classicality” of
the measuring instrument as something we must assume a priori. Hence it
is often asserted that there was an irreducible divide for Bohr between the
quantum and classical realms. According to Jammer:
interpretations, adopt a purely epistemic interpretation of quantum states, intro-
duce hidden variables, or consider deviations from the Schro¨dinger dynamics. See
Schlosshauer (2004, 2007) for discussions of these different options in the context of
decoherence.
5 See Zurek (2005) for an approach to formalizing this local inaccessibility of phase
relations without resorting to reduced density matrices.
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Contrary to Planck and Einstein, Bohr did not try to bridge the gap be-
tween classical and quantum, but from the very beginning of his work, he
searched for a scheme of quantum conceptions which would form a system
just as coherent, on the one side of the abyss, as that of classical notions on
the other (Jammer, 1966, p. 86).
Later Bohr’s conception of classical mechanics, which gave deeper signifi-
cance to his previous ideas on the irreconcilable disparity between classical
and quantum theory, precluded, now on epistemological grounds, the pos-
sibility to interpret the correspondence principle as asserting the inclusion
of classical mechanics within quantum theory (Jammer, 1966, p. 117).
This passage captures what many physicists have understood to be Bohr’s
point of view. But in the time since Jammer wrote this passage in 1966, there
has been a considerable effort on the part of scholars to come to a deeper
understanding about precisely what Bohr meant. In the late 1960s Paul Fey-
erabend (1968, 1969) complained that Bohr’s views had been systematically
distorted by both his critics and his followers, more interested in pursuing
their own philosophical agendas than seriously understanding what he had
to say. With this in mind Feyerabend urged physicists and philosophers to
go “back to Bohr.” A concerted effort to make philosophical sense of Bohr’s
philosophical writings gathered momentum after the Bohr centennial in 1985
(Howard, 1994, pp. 201–2).
In spite of the attention Bohr’s writings have received over the past three
decades, scholarly opinion on how we should understand his thinking remains
divided. This is not the place to discuss the different interpretations of Bohr’s
thought, suffice it to say that there is widespread agreement now that com-
plementarity does not fit neatly with the views of the logical empiricists, nor
should it necessarily be characterized as anti-realist. Bohr’s viewpoint, ar-
ticulated in his reply to the EPR challenge, was that it is not simply the
case that we cannot measure the two well-defined attributes of an object, but
rather that the mutually exclusive experimental arrangements serve to define
the very conditions under which we can unambiguously employ such classical
concepts as position and momentum (Bohr, 1949). The key point for Bohr
then is that quantum mechanics reveals to us the previously “unrecognized
presuppositions for an unambiguous use of our most simple concepts” (Bohr,
1937, pp. 289–90). We cannot ascribe to a particle a “position” in space or
a “momentum” independently of the specific experimental conditions under
which we observe the particle.
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3.2 Bohr, isolated systems, and entanglement
It has sometimes been argued that the characteristic feature of quantum me-
chanics crucial for decoherence—namely entanglement—plays effectively no
role in Bohr’s thinking. However, a closer reading of Bohr suggests this is
not so. Indeed, Bohr’s understanding of the quantum–classical divide turns
out to depend on his recognition of the nonseparability between object and
instrument in the act of measurement.
Early on Bohr recognized that the classical concept of an isolated “object”
which has a well-defined “state” and which interacts with a measuring instru-
ment is rendered problematic in quantum mechanics. This is grounded in the
fact that, as Born observed in 1926, in quantum mechanics “one cannot, as
in classical mechanics, pick out a state of one system and determine how this
is influenced by a state of the other system since all states of both systems
are coupled in a complicated way” (Born, 1983, pp. 52–53). As Bohr noted,
this paradoxical situation in quantum mechanics has serious implications for
the concept of observation. In order to observe a quantum system we must
interact with it using some device serving as a measuring instrument. On the
one hand, in order to observe something about an electron, say its momen-
tum, we must assume that the electron possesses an independent dynamical
state (momentum), which is in principle distinguishable from the state of the
instrument with which it interacts. On the other hand, such an interaction, if
treated quantum-mechanically, destroys the separability of the object and the
instrument, since the resulting entanglement between the two partners means
that they must be described by a single composite nonseparable quantum
state. Such entangled states represent quantum correlations between the two
systems that frequently embody entirely new physical properties for the com-
posite system that are not present in any of the subsystems. In some sense,
the two entangled partners have thus become a single quantum-mechanical
system.
For Bohr, this lay at the heart of the epistemological paradox of quantum
mechanics. Bohr regarded the condition of isolation to be a simple logical de-
mand, because, without such a presupposition, an electron cannot be an “ob-
ject” of empirical knowledge at all. “The crucial point” he explained in 1949,
is that contrary to the situation in classical physics, in quantum mechanics
we are confronted with the “impossibility of any sharp separation between the
behavior of atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring instruments
which serve to define the very conditions under which the phenomena appear”
(Bohr, 1949, p. 210, emphasis in original). Bohr had earlier emphasized this
point at the 1936 “Unity of Science” congress, where he had explained:
A still further revision of the problem of observation has since been made
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necessary by the discovery of the universal quantum of action, which has
taught us that the whole mode of description of classical physics . . . retains
its adequacy only as long as all quantities of action entering into the descrip-
tion are large compared to Planck’s quantum . . . This circumstance, at first
sight paradoxical, finds its elucidation in the recognition that in this region
[where classical mechanics breaks down] it is no longer possible sharply to
distinguish between the autonomous behavior of a physical object and its
inevitable interaction with other bodies serving as measuring instruments,
the direct consideration of which is excluded by the very nature of the con-
cept of observation itself (Bohr, 1937, p. 290).
The “whole mode of description of classical physics” to which Bohr refers
in this passage is nothing other than the condition of separability. It is not
merely that the act of measurement influences or disturbs the object of ob-
servation, but that it is no longer possible to distinguish between the ob-
ject and its interaction with the device serving as a measuring instrument. A
quantum-mechanical treatment of the observational interaction would para-
doxically make the very distinction between object and instrument ambiguous.
However, such a distinction is a necessary condition for empirical inquiry. Af-
ter all, an experiment is carried out precisely to reveal information about some
atomic object. As Bohr was to put it, only so far as we can neglect the “inter-
action between the object and the measuring instrument, which unavoidably
accompanies the establishment of any such connection” can we “speak of an
autonomous space-time behavior of the object under observation” (Bohr, 1937,
p. 291). To speak of an interaction between two separate systems—an object
and measuring instrument—is to speak in terms of classical physics.
3.3 The Heisenberg cut and the Bohr–Heisenberg disagreement about its “shifti-
ness”
Bohr’s view made an immediate and lasting impression on Heisenberg. As
Heisenberg observed, it follows then that from an epistemological point of
view “a peculiar schism in our investigations of atomic processes is inevitable”
(Heisenberg, 1952b, p. 15). In the discussions at the Como conference in
September 1927, Heisenberg explained that in “quantum mechanics, as Pro-
fessor Bohr has displayed, observation plays a quite peculiar role.” In order to
observe a quantum-mechanical object, “one must therefore cut out a partial
system somewhere from the world, and one must make ‘statements’ or ‘obser-
vations’ just about this partial system” (Bohr, 1985, p. 141). The existence
of “the cut between the observed system on the one hand and the observer
and his apparatus on the other hand” is a necessary condition for the pos-
sibility of empirical knowledge. Without the assumption of such a divide we
could not speak of the “object” of empirical knowledge in quantum mechan-
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ics. Heisenberg emphasized the significance of the cut [Schnitt ] throughout the
1930s. In his lecture on “Questions of Principle in Modern Physics” delivered
in November 1935 in Vienna, Heisenberg explained:
In this situation it follows automatically that, in a mathematical treatment
of the process, a dividing line must be drawn between, on the one hand,
the apparatus which we use as an aid in putting the question and thus,
in a way, treat as part of ourselves, and on the other hand, the physical
systems we wish to investigate. The latter we represent mathematically as
a wave function. This function, according to quantum theory, consists of
a differential equation which determines any future state from the present
state of the function . . . The dividing line between the system to be observed
and the measuring apparatus is immediately defined by the nature of the
problem but it obviously signifies no discontinuity of the physical process.
For this reason there must, within certain limits, exist complete freedom in
choosing the position of the dividing line (Heisenberg, 1952a, p. 49, emphasis
added).
This point had been emphasized in his lecture the previous year, in which
Heisenberg argued that “there arises the necessity to draw a clear dividing
line in the description of atomic processes, between the measuring apparatus
of the observer which is described in classical concepts, and the object under
observation, whose behavior is represented by a wave function” (Heisenberg,
1952b, p. 15). This was the central theme in an unpublished paper, written
in 1935 entitled Ist eine deterministische Erga¨nzung der Quantenmechanik
mo¨glich?, in which Heisenberg outlined his own response to the criticisms of
quantum mechanics which had emerged from such physicists as von Laue,
Schro¨dinger and Einstein in the 1930s. A draft of the paper is contained in his
letter to Pauli on 2 July 1935 (Pauli, 1985, pp. 409–18 [item 414]). The paper,
which was written at Pauli’s urging, argued that a deterministic completion
of quantum mechanics is in principle impossible. This is because in quantum
mechanics we must draw a cut between the quantum-mechanical system to
be investigated, represented by a wave function in configuration space, and
the measuring instrument described by means of classical concepts. The crit-
ical point for Heisenberg is that “this cut can be shifted arbitrarily far in the
direction of the observer in the region that can otherwise be described accord-
ing to the laws of classical physics,” but of course, “the cut cannot be shifted
arbitrarily in the direction of the atomic system” (Heisenberg, 1985, p. 414).
No matter where we chose to place the cut, classical physics remains valid on
the side of the measuring device, and quantum mechanics remains valid on
the side of the atomic system.
There were, however, key differences, which have often been overlooked, be-
tween Bohr and Heisenberg in their respective analyses of the quantum–
classical divide. The crucial point seems to have been that for Heisenberg
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the location of the cut “cannot be established physically”—it represents no
physical discontinuity—“and moreover it is precisely the arbitrariness in the
choice of the location of the cut that is decisive for the application of quantum
mechanics” (Heisenberg, 1985, p. 416). We know from an exchange of corre-
spondence in the 1930s that Bohr objected to Heisenberg’s view that the cut
could be shifted arbitrarily far in the direction of the apparatus (Archives for
the History of Quantum Physics: Heisenberg to Bohr 10 August 1935, Bohr
to Heisenberg 10 September 1935, Bohr to Heisenberg 15 September 1935,
Heisenberg to Bohr 29 September 1935). Heisenberg explained to Bohr that
without such a presupposition one would have to conclude that there exist
“two categories of physical systems—classical and quantum-mechanical ones”
(Archives for the History of Quantum Physics, Heisenberg to Bohr 29 Septem-
ber 1935). Heisenberg acknowledged that strictly speaking, however, the laws
of quantum mechanics are applicable to all systems (including the measur-
ing instrument). As Heisenberg pointed out in the discussions that followed
Bohr’s Como paper in September 1927: “One may treat the whole world as
one mechanical system, but then only a mathematical problem remains while
access to observation is closed off” (Bohr, 1985, p. 141). 6 It was therefore an
epistemological condition that one had to introduce the cut into the quantum-
mechanical description.
The view outlined by Heisenberg leaves it ambiguous under what circum-
stances we are entitled to consider the apparatus “classically,” and under
what circumstances it should be treated as a “quantum-mechanical” system.
Certain physicists were also troubled by how we are to understand the inter-
action between a “quantum-mechanical” system and a “classical” measuring
apparatus. Such an interaction does not appear to be subsumed under either
classical or quantum theory. Moreover the division between the quantum and
the classical realms seems to coincide exactly with the object–instrument and
microscopic–macroscopic distinctions. It appears odd that there should be a
fundamental difference between microscopic and macroscopic systems.
Heisenberg’s treatment of the cut between the “quantum” object and the
“classical” measuring device has often been taken as a faithful representa-
6 Interestingly, Everett’s relative-state interpretation (Everett, 1957)—and its sub-
sequent development into many-worlds (DeWitt, 1970, 1971; Deutsch, 1985) and
many-minds interpretations (Lockwood, 1996; Zeh, 2000))—have taken precisely
the route of considering a single closed quantum-mechanical system, containing,
among other things, the observers themselves, and then try to account for observers
and their observations from within this formalism. Heisenberg’s charge that in this
case “only a mathematical problem remains” would then be transformed into a
merit by Everett’s idea of letting the quantum-mechanical formalism provide its
own interpretation—a program that Bohr would have likely disagreed with, since
for him the formalism by itself would become meaningless without the prior as-
sumption of classical concepts.
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tion of Bohr’s most carefully considered view of the problem of measurement.
However, Heisenberg frequently alluded to his disagreement with Bohr on this
matter in the 1930s. In Physics and Philosophy, he explained that “Bohr has
emphasized that it is more realistic to state that the division into the object
and rest of the world is not arbitrary” and the object is determined by the very
nature of the experiment (Heisenberg, 1989, p. 24). Writing to Heelan in 1975,
Heisenberg explained that he and Bohr had never really resolved their dis-
agreement about “whether the cut between that part of the experiment which
should be described in classical terms and the other quantum-theoretical part
had a well defined position or not.” In his letter Heisenberg stated that he
had “argued that a cut could be moved around to some extent while Bohr
preferred to think that the position is uniquely defined in every experiment”
(Heelan, 1975, p. 137). Weizsa¨cker also later recalled that Heisenberg had dis-
agreed with Bohr over the cut in the 1930s (Weizsa¨cker, 1987, p. 283). The
Heisenberg–Bohr exchange would seem to suggest that for Bohr, the quantum–
classical distinction corresponds to something “objective,” and is not merely
an arbitrary division.
3.4 Howard’s reconstruction of Bohr’s doctrine of classical concepts and im-
proper mixtures in decoherence
So how are we to understand Bohr’s own view of the cut argument, and what
does this have to do with the modern decoherence approach? An important
clue can be found in a paper in which Howard (1994) suggested a new interpre-
tation (termed a “reconstruction”) of Bohr’s classical concepts. In particular,
Howard addressed the question of what Bohr meant when he insisted on the
use of a classical description, and the question of precisely where such a clas-
sical description is to be employed. He argued that a careful reconstruction
of Bohr’s views shows that for him “the classical/quantum distinction” did
not exactly coincide with the “instrument/object distinction” whereas this
seems to have been precisely the case for Heisenberg. Bohr, it seems, was keen
to avoid the mistaken impression that the “classical” instrument somehow
interacts with the “quantum” object. According to Howard,
it is widely assumed that Bohr’s intention was that a classical description be
given to the measuring apparatus in its entirety, a quantum description be-
ing given presumably, to the observed object in its entirety. On this view, the
classical/quantum distinction would coincide with the instrument/object
distinction; hence, its designation in what follows as the “coincidence in-
terpretation” of the doctrine of classical concepts. I will argue instead that
the two distinctions cut across one another, that Bohr required a classical
description of some, but not necessarily all, features of the instrument and
more surprisingly, perhaps, a classical description of some features of the
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observed object as well. More specifically I will argue that Bohr demanded
a classical description only of those properties of the measuring instrument
that are correlated, in the measurement interaction, with the properties of
the observed object that we seek to measure; and that this implies, as well,
a classical description of the associated measured properties of the observed
object itself (Howard, 1994, p. 203).
Howard’s reconstruction provides a new reading of many crucial passages from
Bohr’s writings, in which “the classical/quantum distinction corresponds to
an objective feature of the world.” Furthermore, this reading of Bohr makes
it clear that there is no explicit or implicit appeal to the vague notion that
the measuring instrument is a “macroscopic” object, having certain dimen-
sions (Howard, 1994, p. 211). Howard argues that Bohr’s classical descriptions
may be interpreted—in agreement with, but not forced out by, Bohr’s own
writings—as the appropriate use of proper mixtures for the measured system
in place of the global pure state describing the entangled system–apparatus
state which is produced as the result of a von Neumann measurement. Ac-
cordingly, this transition is motivated by Bohr’s insistence on an unambiguous
and objective description of quantum phenomena, which requires the classical
concept of separability between the observed (the system) and the observer
(the apparatus). However, the feature of quantum entanglement shows—as
evidenced by examples such as EPR (Einstein et al., 1935) and von Neu-
mann’s measurement scheme with its famous application to Schro¨dinger’s cat
(Schro¨dinger, 1935a)—that such separability no longer holds. As discussed in
Sec. 2.1, in a von Neumann measurement,
|Ψ0〉 =
(∑
n
cn|sn〉
)
|a0〉 −→ |Ψ〉 =
∑
n
cn|sn〉|an〉, (5)
the final joint system–apparatus state does not factor into a tensor-product
state |s′〉|a′〉, and thus no individual quantum state can be attributed to either
the system or the apparatus. Evidently, the classical concept of independence
and separability between the system and the apparatus no longer holds.
Howard suggests that Bohr’s classical concepts may be identified with the se-
lection of subensembles that are appropriate to the measurement context (i.e.,
in Bohr’s terminology, that are appropriate to the particular “experimental
arrangement”), in the following sense. Consider the density matrix correspond-
ing to the final state on the right-hand side of Eq. (5),
ρˆSA = |Ψ〉〈Ψ| =
∑
nm
cnc
∗
m
|sn〉〈sm| ⊗ |an〉〈am| 6= ρˆS ⊗ ρˆA, (6)
and suppose that the measurement of interest is described by the apparatus
observable Oˆ =
∑
m om|am〉〈am|. Then the statistics of such a measurement
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will be exhaustively described by the subensemble
ρˆSA|
Oˆ
=
∑
n
|cn|
2 |sn〉〈sn| ⊗ |an〉〈an| ≡
∑
n
|cn|
2
ρˆ
(n)
SA|
Oˆ
. (7)
Here the interference terms n 6= m have been a priori neglected, since they
cannot be measured by the chosen observable Oˆ. For all purposes of this partic-
ular measurement, an ignorance interpretation (d’Espagnat, 1966, 1976, 1995)
is then attached to the conditional density matrix (7). That is, ρˆSA|
Oˆ
is inter-
preted as describing a situation in which the system–apparatus combination is
in one of the pure states |sn〉|an〉 but we simply do not know in which. In this
way, the density matrix (7) is by assumption (associated with Bohr’s assump-
tion of “classical concepts”) taken to represent a proper (classical) mixture of
the “outcome states” |sn〉|an〉 for a measurement (“properization” of the full
density matrix conditioned on the particular measurement).
According to Howard, Bohr’s mutually exclusive experimental arrangements
may then be identified with the choice of such effective mixtures conditioned
on the particular measurement setup. Thus we may say that the different
decompositions of the global density matrix into proper subensembles corre-
spond to the different observables measured by each of the arrangements. No
single “properized” mixture of the form (7) will give the correct statistics for
all possible observables but will suffice for the measurement of observables co-
diagonal in the basis used in expanding the mixture. This ties in with Bohr’s
notion of the existence of classical measurement apparatuses: In Howard’s
reading, the assumption of classicality for such apparatuses would then cor-
respond to the existence of preferred apparatus observables whose eigenbases
determine the particular “properized” mixtures, which in turn exhaustively
describe the statistics of these particular measurements.
Howard’s reconstruction actually fits rather nicely with what we know of the
disagreement between Bohr and Heisenberg concerning the cut between “ob-
ject” and the instrument. It also allows us to draw a particularly interesting
connection to decoherence, and in fact gives Bohr’s “classical concepts” (in-
terpreted in the sense of Howard’s reconstruction) a more precise meaning. In
Howard’s picture, for Bohr the choice between different “properized” mixtures
was simply a result of knowing which observable was measured by a particu-
lar experimental arrangement. However, first, what determines this observable
on physical grounds? And second, in many cases the formalism allows us to
rewrite such a mixture in many different bases (e.g., for Bell states) and thus
does not uniquely fix the basis which supposedly should correspond to a par-
ticular experimental arrangement. How can one circumvent this problem of
basis ambiguity as posed by the formalism of quantum mechanics? Third,
what precisely justifies neglecting the interference terms in the global density
matrix?
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To all questions decoherence provides an answer. In any realistic account of
measurement, we ought to include further interactions with the environment.
As a consequence of decoherence, there will be at least one preferred basis in
which the interference terms between different one-to-one quantum-correlated
system–apparatus states in the reduced system–apparatus density matrix will
be sufficiently small in order to be neglected in practice. We thus arrive at a
system–apparatus density matrix that is formally identical to (7). The rele-
vant observable is determined by the structure of the apparatus–environment
interaction Hamiltonian (Zurek, 1981, 1982), while in other bases system–
apparatus correlations would be rapidly destroyed by the environment and
therefore the apparatus could not function reliably (this is the “stability crite-
rion” introduced by Zurek, 1982). The preferred (environment-superselected)
basis may then be regarded as corresponding to Bohr’s notion of a particular
physical arrangement that is used to measure the system. This allows us to
explain why measurement devices appear to be designed to measure certain
physical quantities but not others, while in the absence of decoherence we
would in general face the preferred-basis problem (Zurek, 1982; Schlosshauer,
2004). Decoherence thus supplies a physical criterion for the choice of the
particular “properized” ensemble in Howard’s reconstruction.
This dynamical picture also allows us to precisely quantify the location of the
Heisenberg cut, or, in the terminology of Howard’s reconstruction, of when
and where we may make the replacement of the density matrix by a “proper-
ized” mixture. In any given physical situation, we can (at least in principle)
model the relevant interactions between the subsystems and thus, for each
chosen subsystem, precisely determine the degree to which certain interfer-
ence effects may be observable in a local measurement performed on this
subsystem. This allows us to quantify the degree to which the subsystem is
rendered effectively classical with respect to different local observables. This
ability to precisely pinpoint the location of the quantum–classical divide by
taking into account the relevant decoherence effects represents an enormous
progress over the Heisenberg picture, where it was simply left to the judgment
of the observer where to place the cut.
One important point, however, remains. Reduced density matrices obtained
by tracing out the environment are not ignorance-interpretable since, as Pes-
soa Jr. (1998, p. 432) put it, “taking a partial trace amounts to the statis-
tical version of the projection postulate.” By contrast, the system–apparatus
density matrices in the Bohr–Howard picture are derived from simply neglect-
ing the interference terms and then assuming that the resulting mixture is
ignorance-interpretable. This involves a conceptual leap just as severe as that
of choosing to interpret reduced density matrix as ignorance interpretable. In
both cases, quantum mechanics forbids us to attach such an interpretation.
Scholars working on decoherence have been (at least lately) very careful in
making this point. Howard emphasizes this issue, too, but his reconstruction
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is precisely all about associating Bohr’s assumption of classical concepts with
a deliberately ignorance of this point.
We see that Howard’s reconstruction has the merit of providing a specific for-
malization of Bohr’s notion of classical concepts, and decoherence shows how
this formalization can be physically motivated, justified, and quantified. If we
follow Howard and take Bohr’s classical concepts as amounting to a replace-
ment of quantum-mechanical ensembles by classical mixtures that depend on
the measurement context, then decoherence indeed allows us to derive these
concepts (modulo the fundamental problem of the transition to ignorance-
interpretable mixtures). Or, put differently, decoherence allows us to tell a
dynamical, physical story of these concepts.
3.5 Heisenberg, entanglement, and the external world
Looking back over the history of the foundations of quantum mechanics, we
can now see the crucial obstacle to an understanding of the quantum-to-
classical transition was the erroneous assumption that we can treat quantum
systems as isolated from the environment. It is true that Bohr had earlier un-
derstood very well that the properties exhibited by quantum systems cannot
be separated from the experimental conditions under which they are observed.
But he does not appear to have extended this argument to the measuring appa-
ratus and its environment: Bohr was simply content to assume the classicality
of the experimental apparatus. The recognition that it is precisely the open-
ness of quantum systems and the resulting environmental entanglement that
may explain how these systems become effectively classical was the crucial
insight in the decoherence account.
However, there do appear to be anticipations of the relevance of the environ-
ment in certain passages in Heisenberg’s writings from the 1950s. In his contri-
bution to the volume commemorating Bohr’s seventieth birthday, Heisenberg
gave his most systematic defense of what he referred to as the “Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum mechanics.” In the paper Heisenberg remarked that
many authors had pointed out that the so-called “reduction of wave-packets
cannot be deduced from the Schro¨dinger’s equation” and that to this extent a
number of physicists had drawn the conclusion “that there is an inconsistency
in the ‘orthodox’ interpretation” (Heisenberg, 1955, p. 23). Yet, as Heisenberg
emphasized, the reason that the quantum-mechanical treatment of the “inter-
action of the system with the measuring apparatus” does not of itself “as a
rule lead to a definite result (e.g. the blackening of a photographic plate)” is
that in such a treatment “the apparatus and the system are regarded as cut
off from the rest of the world and treated as a whole according to quantum
mechanics” (Heisenberg, 1955, p. 22). However, as Heisenberg explained: “If
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the measuring device would be isolated from the rest of the world, it would be
neither a measuring device nor could it be described in the terms of classical
physics at all” (Heisenberg, 1989, p. 24). Somewhat surprisingly Heisenberg
attributed this view to Bohr:
Bohr has rightly pointed out on many occasions that the connection with the
external world is one of the necessary conditions for the measuring apparatus
to perform its function, since the behavior of the measuring apparatus must
be capable of being . . . described in terms of simple [classical] concepts,
if the apparatus is to be used as a measuring instrument at all. And the
connection with the external world is therefore necessary . . .We see that a
system cut off from the external world . . . cannot be described in terms of
classical concepts (Heisenberg, 1955, pp. 26–7, emphasis added).
Here Heisenberg appears to connect the fact that the measuring instrument
cannot be isolated from the rest of the world with the need to use classi-
cal concepts in the description of the experiment. In Physics and Philosophy
Heisenberg makes more explicit this connection between the inseparability of
the “system” and the “external world” and the quantum-to-classical transi-
tion:
Again the obvious starting point for the physical interpretation of the for-
malism seems to be the fact that mathematical scheme of quantum me-
chanics approaches that of classical mechanics in dimensions which are large
compared to the size of atoms. But even this statement must be made with
some reservations. Even in large dimensions there are many solutions of
the quantum-mechanical equations to which no analogous solutions can be
found in classical physics. In these solutions the phenomenon of the “inter-
ference of probabilities” would show up . . . [which] does not exist in classi-
cal physics. Therefore, even in the limit of large dimensions the correlation
between the mathematical symbols, the measurements, and the ordinary
concepts [i.e., the quantum-to-classical transition] is by no means trivial.
In order to get at such an unambiguous correlation one must take another
feature of the problem into account. It must be observed that the system
which is treated by the methods of quantum mechanics is in fact a part of
a much bigger system (eventually the whole world); it is interacting with
this bigger system; and one must add that the microscopic properties of the
bigger system are (at least to a large extent) unknown. This statement is
undoubtedly a correct description of the actual situation . . . The interac-
tion with the bigger system with its undefined microscopic properties then
introduces a new statistical element into the description . . . of the system
under consideration. In the limiting case of the large dimensions this sta-
tistical element destroys the effects of the “interference of probabilities” in
such a manner that the quantum-mechanical scheme really approaches the
classical one in the limit (Heisenberg, 1989, pp. 121–2).
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In this intriguing passage Heisenberg recognizes that it cannot simply be the
macroscopic dimensions of the measuring apparatus that ensure that the ap-
paratus becomes effectively classical. In the reconstruction of Bohr’s view of
the quantum–classical divide presented earlier, attention is restricted to the
interaction between the system and the apparatus. There the description of
the measured system by a proper mixture is justified by referring to the need
for an objective account of experimental results. In the passages quoted above,
however, Heisenberg enlarges the system–apparatus composite to include cou-
plings to further degrees of freedom in the environment (the “external world”).
This is a most interesting point. Of course, for practical purposes, Heisenberg
admits that we often treat the quantum system and the measuring apparatus
as isolated from the rest of the world. But the quantum-to-classical transition
depends on “the underlying assumption,” implicit in the Copenhagen inter-
pretation, “that the interference terms are in the actual experiment removed
by the partly undefined interactions of the measuring apparatus, with the sys-
tem and with the rest of the world (in the formalism, the interaction produces
a ‘mixture’)” (Heisenberg, 1955, p. 23).
Heisenberg’s account may be read as anticipating results of the decoherence
program in two ways. First, in the formal description of decoherence, the envi-
ronment is traced out, arriving at an improper mixtures, which is then, for all
practical purposes of statistical prediction, interpreted as a proper mixture.
Second, because the Quantum Darwinism program (Blume-Kohout and Zurek,
2006) precisely shows how the environment plays the role of an information
channel that “objectifies” (in an effective sense) the information represented
by the system–apparatus quantum correlations through redundant encoding.
The account also shows some interesting parallels to the distinction between
decoherence and classical noise. Noise describes a situation in which the sys-
tem is perturbed by the environment. However, decoherence corresponds to a
measurement-like process in which the system perturbs the environment, in
the sense that the superposition initially confined to the system spreads to
the system–environment combination. The nonlocal nature of quantum states
then implies that this “distortion” of the environment by the system in turn
influences the observable properties at the level of the system (as formally
described by the reduced density matrix).
However, while Heisenberg emphasizes the importance of environmental in-
teractions, nowhere does he explicate the role of entanglement between the
system and the environment as the crucial point in the emergence of classi-
cality in the system. In discussing the extent to which quantum mechanics
gives an “objective” description of the world, Heisenberg draws attention to
the fact that “classical physics is just that idealization in which we speak
about the parts of the world without any reference to ourselves” (Heisenberg,
1989, p. 22). Here Heisenberg is careful to avoid the impression that quan-
tum mechanics contains any “genuine subjective features”—he categorically
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denies that the mind of the observer plays any crucial role in the measurement
process. But he does suggest that “quantum theory only corresponds to this
ideal [of the separability of ‘objects’] as far as possible.” Heisenberg maintains
that the somewhat arbitrary “division of the world into the ‘object’ and the
rest of the world” is the starting point of quantum mechanics. To this extent,
he seems to have been of the view that such a division between “object” and
the “rest of the world” was indispensable for physics, in spite of the fact that
quantum systems exhibit radical nonseparability (Heisenberg, 1989, p. 23). It
is the hallmark of decoherence that it begins from the assumption that the
quantum system and apparatus cannot be isolated from the surrounding envi-
ronment, and moreover that it is precisely this feature of quantum mechanics
which results in the emergence of classicality.
Physicists such as Bohr, Heisenberg, and Schro¨dinger had recognized the
nonseparability of quantum systems—i.e., entanglement—as a characteristic
feature of quantum mechanics. For example, Schro¨dinger, who had coined
the term “entanglement” (Verschra¨nkung in German) in 1935 (Schro¨dinger,
1935a,b, 1936), referred to this nonseparability not as “one but rather the
characteristic trait of quantum mechanics, the one that enforces its entire
departure from classical lines of thought” (Schro¨dinger, 1935b, p. 555, em-
phasis in the original). But the feeling prevailed that entanglement was some-
thing unusual and a peculiarly microscopic phenomenon that would have to
be carefully created in the laboratory (such as in an EPR-type experiment).
Entanglement was regarded as an essential quantum feature that would neces-
sarily have to be irreconcilable with classicality. These long-held beliefs likely
contributed to the comparably late “discovery” of decoherence (Schlosshauer,
2007). It is indeed a particular irony that entanglement would turn out to be
not something that had to be tamed in some way to ensure classicality but
would instead assume a key role in the emergence of classicality.
4 The doctrine of classical concepts
4.1 The doctrine of classical concepts revisited
It remains here to comment on the extent to which we can say that the decoher-
ence account of measurement runs counter to Bohr’s original view of classical
concepts. In order to do this, it seems necessary to get a clearer picture of
precisely why Bohr thought we must use classical concepts. This is a question
that has puzzled many physicists and philosophers, but unfortunately Bohr
never really clarified his views on this issue. Howard’s reconstruction of Bohr’s
doctrine of classical concepts is instructive, but in the end it simply begs the
question: Why are we are entitled to replace the quantum-mechanical density
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matrix with a particular “classical” mixture? Or, within the decoherence-based
account of Howard’s reconstruction, how can we justify the use of improper
mixtures without presuming the usual axioms of measurement, which underlie
the formalism and interpretation of improper mixtures as the formal entities
that completely encapsulate all local measurement statistics (Schlosshauer,
2004)?
Indeed much of what we know of Bohr’s position comes from scattered re-
marks, often interpreted through his contemporaries, many of whom took
up the role of Bohr’s self-appointed spokesmen. The situation becomes more
difficult when we realize that Bohr’s views were appropriated by a number
of different philosophical schools of thought such as positivism, Kantianism,
critical realism, linguistic idealism, dialectical materialism, and even pragma-
tism. One reason that Bohr’s writings were so readily adapted to different
philosophical positions is that many of his contemporaries saw it as their task
to clarify Bohr’s views, which were often not expressed quite as clearly as
they might have been. To this extent, many different versions of Bohr’s views
had emerged by the 1960s, some of which were diametrically opposed to one
another.
In spite of the difficulty of this situation, we can make sense of the differ-
ent versions of Bohr’s doctrine of classical concepts by carefully drawing two
useful distinctions. The first is what might be termed the pragmatic versus
categorical version of the doctrine of classical concepts, and the second is the
distinction between an epistemological and physical formulation of the doc-
trine. We will address both in turn here.
4.2 Pragmatic versus categorical formulations
In probing the doctrine of classical concepts, it is important to note something
which Beller (1999, pp. 197–9) has highlighted in her recent work. Bohr’s edict
that we must use classical concepts was sometimes given a more pragmatic
interpretation by Bohr and his followers, namely, that we simply do use classi-
cal concepts in describing the results of measurements in quantum mechanics,
and that this is the situation we find ourselves in. One certainly finds this
“weaker” version of the doctrine of classical concepts in the writings of Rosen-
feld, Heisenberg, and Weizsa¨cker. Thus the doctrine is transformed from a
categorical imperative to a pragmatic statement of the fact. In his book on
the Worldview of Modern Physics, Weizsa¨cker makes explicit this subtle, but
important, shift of emphasis:
We ought not to say, “Every experiment that is even possible must be clas-
sically described,” but “Every actual experiment known to us is classically
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described, and we do not know how to proceed otherwise.” This statement
is not sufficient to prove that the proposition is a priori true for all, merely
possible future knowledge; not is this demanded by the concrete scientific
situation. It is enough for us to know that it is a priori valid for quantum
mechanics . . .We have resolved not to say, “Every experiment must be clas-
sically described” but simply, “Every experiment is classically described.”
Thus the factual, we might almost say historical situation of physics is made
basic to our propositions (Weizsa¨cker, 1952, pp. 128, 130).
Here Weizsa¨cker is clear that the doctrine of classical concepts has “not log-
ical but factual necessity.” In other words, it is simply the case that quan-
tum mechanics is founded upon experimental results that are described by
means of classical concepts. Physicists defending Bohr’s doctrine of classi-
cal concepts often resorted to this pragmatic formulation when challenged.
Heisenberg provides another case in point. Responding to the suggestion that
it might be possible to “depart from classical concepts” in providing a gen-
uinely quantum-mechanical description of experiments, Heisenberg explained
that classical concepts
are an essential part of the language which forms the basis of all natural
science. Our actual situation in science is such that we do use classical con-
cepts for the description of experiments, and it was the problem of quantum
theory to find a theoretical interpretation of the experiments on this basis
(Heisenberg, 1989, p. 23, emphasis added).
Here the historical and pragmatic dependence of quantum mechanics on clas-
sical concepts is once again emphasized.
Of course simply appealing to the fact that we happen to use classical concepts
does not of itself prove that we cannot conceptualize the world of experience
in any other way. Weizsa¨cker and Heisenberg certainly recognized this, but the
point they stressed was that our current theory of quantum mechanics only
corresponds to what can be observed if we assume that the results of mea-
surements are described in terms of the basic concepts of classical physics.
For Bohr, on the other hand, the doctrine of classical concepts was expressed
more categorically: “It lies in the nature of physical observation . . . that all
experience must ultimately be expressed in terms of classical concepts” (Bohr,
1987, p. 94, emphasis added); “the unambiguous interpretation of any mea-
surement must be essentially framed in terms of classical physical theories,
and we may say that in the sense the language of Newton and Maxwell will
remain the language of physics for all time” (Bohr, 1931, p. 692, emphasis
added). This brings us back to the question posed at the beginning of this
section: Why must we interpret observations classically? In a letter to Bohr
written in October 1935, Schro¨dinger asked Bohr why this remained one of his
deepest convictions (Bohr, 1996, pp. 508–9). Bohr’s reply unfortunately does
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not shed much light on the matter, as he simply restated what he saw as “the
seemingly obvious fact that the functioning of the measuring apparatus must
be described in space and time” (Bohr, 1996, pp. 511–2).
The task of answering the question was left largely to Bohr’s followers such
as Heisenberg, Weizsa¨cker, Rosenfeld, and Petersen, many of whom were in
essential disagreement about the finer points of Bohr’s interpretation. Yet,
in spite of the diversity of viewpoints, we can distinguish two fundamentally
different approaches to answering the question left by Bohr. These may be
labeled as the epistemological and physical formulations of the doctrine of
classical concepts. A deeper understanding of these two approaches provides
an important clue to understanding what is really meant by Bohr’s doctrine
of classical concepts and how it relates to decoherence. It is to this that we
now turn our attention.
4.3 Epistemological versus physical versions
Much of the discussion over the extent to which decoherence marks a break
from the “Copenhagen” viewpoint suffers from the failure to fully appreciate
the different ways in which the question of why we must use classical concepts
in the description of experiments was interpreted by Bohr’s followers. Here we
need to distinguish two fundamental approaches.
In the first instance those who defended Bohr tended to frame the question
in epistemological terms. This amounts to asking why our conceptual frame-
work is so wedded to our classical intuitions about the world. Physicists who
approached the doctrine of classical concepts from this perspective attempted
to give the doctrine a decidedly Kantian, linguistic, or pragmatic reading.
Weizsa¨cker and Heisenberg, for example, were inclined to interpret Bohr as
having “pragmatized” or “relativized” Kant’s philosophy (Camilleri, 2005). In
this context Heisenberg would pronounce in 1934 that “modern physics has
more accurately defined the limits of the idea of the a priori in the exact
sciences, than was possible in the time of Kant” (Heisenberg, 1952b, p. 21).
Some authors such as Faye (1991) have argued that Bohr himself was influ-
enced by Kantian tradition through his association with the Danish philoso-
pher Høffding. Petersen argued that “Bohr’s remarks” on the indispensability
of classical concepts “are based on his general attitude to the epistemologi-
cal status of language and to the meaning of unambiguous conceptual com-
munication, and they should be interpreted in that background” (Petersen,
1968, p. 179). Much has been made of Petersen’s remarks on Bohr’s view of
the primacy of language over reality in quantum mechanics. Indeed on many
occasions Bohr emphasized that an “objective” description amounts to the
possibility of “unambiguous communication,” and to this extent it must be
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expressed through concepts of classical physics. Petersen saw Bohr’s writings
as having provided a deep insight “into the epistemological role of the concep-
tual framework” of classical physics (p. 185).
While approaching the meaning of doctrine of classical concepts from an al-
together different philosophical perspective, Rosenfeld agreed that Bohr’s pri-
mary concerns arose from “general epistemological considerations about the
function of language as a means of communicating experience” (Rosenfeld,
1979b, p. 526). Rosenfeld argued that “we must make use of the concept of
classical physics” in describing phenomena, simply because we must attempt
to make ourselves understood to other human beings, and here the concepts
of classical physics provide the means by which we can unambiguously com-
municate the results of our observations. The concepts of classical physics are
for Rosenfeld not to be understood as somehow part of the a priori structure
of the human mind, but have adapted to our experience of the world. Given
that all experimental knowledge of the atomic world involves the amplification
of effects such that they can be perceived by human beings at the macrolevel,
it should therefore come as no surprise that the classical concepts form the
basis of our description of experience even in quantum mechanics.
Yet, the epistemological perspective invariably leads to another question, which
amounts to a reformulation of the doctrine of classical concepts in physical
terms. We may state this as follows: Why is the world such that the concepts
of classical physics can be employed, at least to a very good approximation,
in certain situations? Or, to put it another way: Why are classical concepts
applicable at all to the quantum world? This is a salient question, given that,
strictly speaking, the world is nonclassical. While Bohr himself did not at-
tempt to provide such a physical explanation for the doctrine of classical
concepts, in the 1950s and 1960s a number of physicists turned their attention
to accounting for the emergence of classicality wholly within the framework of
quantum mechanics. This approach, which is closer in spirit to the decoher-
ence program, was pursued by those who saw themselves as working within the
“Copenhagen” tradition. The passage quoted earlier from Heisenberg, in which
he attempts to explain the quantum-to-classical transition, may be taken as
one example.
In the 1960s Weizsa¨cker and Rosenfeld both attempted to defend this kind of
approach to the physics of the quantum-to-classical transition as entirely in
keeping with the spirit in which Bohr had intended his doctrine of classical
concepts. As Weizsa¨cker put it at a colloquium in 1968, “the crucial point in
the Copenhagen interpretation” is captured, “but not very luckily expressed,
in Bohr’s famous statement that all experiments are to be described in classical
terms” (Weizsa¨cker, 1971, p. 25). As a devotee of Bohr, this was a view that
Weizsa¨cker endorsed wholeheartedly, but which he now wished to justify. “My
proposed answer is that Bohr was essentially right” in arguing that the results
of all measurements must be classically describable, i.e. localized in space-
time, “but that he did not know why” (Weizsa¨cker, 1971, p. 28). The paradox
at the heart of the Copenhagen interpretation for Weizsa¨cker is therefore to be
stated: “Having thus accepted the falsity of classical physics, taken literally,
we must ask how it can be explained as an essentially good approximation”
when describing objects at the macrolevel. He spells this out:
This amounts to asking what physical condition must be imposed on a
quantum-theoretical system in order that it should show the features which
we describe as “classical.” My hypothesis is that this is precisely the con-
dition that it should be suitable as a measuring instrument. If we ask what
that presupposes, a minimum condition seems to be that irreversible pro-
cesses should take place in the system. For every measurement must produce
a trace of what has happened; an event that goes completely unregistered
is not a measurement. Irreversibility implies a description of the system in
which some of the information that we may think of as being present in the
system is not actually used. Hence the system is certainly not in a “pure
state”; we will describe it as a “mixture.” I am unable to prove mathemat-
ically that the condition of irreversibility would suffice to define a classical
approximation, but I feel confident it is a necessary condition (Weizsa¨cker,
1971, p. 29, emphasis in original).
Already in the 1960s a number of physicists had devoted themselves to investi-
gating the thermodynamic conditions of irreversibility that would need to hold
in order for a measurement to be registered macroscopically as “classical.” In
1965 Rosenfeld conceded that “it is understandable that in order to exhibit
more directly the link between the physical concepts and their mathematical
representation, a more formal rendering of Bohr’s argument should be at-
tempted” (Rosenfeld, 1979a, p. 536). In fact, Rosenfeld felt that this had been
carried out by Daneri, Loinger, and Prosperi (1962) in their thermodynamic
analysis of the irreversible amplification process triggered by the interaction
between the quantum system and the measuring device. For Rosenfeld this
work had clarified many of the misunderstandings, which had arisen through
“the deficiencies in von Neumann’s axiomatic treatment” (Rosenfeld, 1979a,
p. 537).
However, this would prove to be a controversial claim, which generated much
debate and discussion well into the 1970s. As Jammer puts it, “Rosenfeld’s
unqualified endorsement of the Daneri, Loinger, and Prosperi measurement
theory raises the question whether this is really congenial, or at least not
incompatible, with the basic tenets of the Copenhagen interpretation” (Jam-
mer, 1974, p. 493). Whereas for Rosenfeld, this theory of measurement was
“in complete harmony with Bohr’s ideas” (Rosenfeld, 1979a, p. 539), for Bub
it represented an approach to quantum theory fundamentally at odds with
Bohr’s (Bub, 1971, p. 65). While a closer historical analysis is beyond the
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scope of this paper, the episode is indicative of the attempts to reformulate
Bohr’s doctrine of classical concepts in the 1960s. It was nevertheless clear
to Wigner that “the transition to a classical description of the apparatus” in
this kind of approach was “an arbitrary step” which only served to “postulate
the miracle which disturbs us” (Wigner, 1995, p. 65). It was not until studies
of decoherence were conducted that physicists were able to give an adequate
account of the elusive quantum-to-classical transition.
4.4 Decoherence and the doctrine of classical concepts
As we have seen, decoherence provides a dynamical account of key compo-
nents of the quantum-to-classical transition, and in doing so, clarifies many of
the issues that had troubled an earlier generation of physicists. However, the
extent to which this marks a departure from Bohr’s doctrine of classical con-
cepts depends in large part on the way in which we interpret the doctrine. In
attempting to find a physical foundation for the doctrine, Heisenberg, Rosen-
feld, and Weizsa¨cker were asking questions to which decoherence now supplies
a ready-made answer. They saw this effort as an extension of the general line
of thought initiated by Bohr, and entirely keeping with the spirit in which
he approached quantum mechanics. We may recall that for Bohr, the experi-
mental arrangements serve to define the very conditions under which we can
unambiguously employ such classical concepts as position and momentum.
Decoherence certainly goes beyond anything that Bohr had to say in identify-
ing ubiquitous and practically irreversible entanglement with a large number
of environmental degrees of freedom as the crucial process which leads to the
emergence of classicality in quantum systems (at least in an effective “relative-
state” sense). Decoherence shows the conditions under which classicality arises
in quantum mechanics, and to this extent it may be regarded as providing a
physical justification for the pragmatic use of classical concepts in a given
experimental situation.
Does the irreducibility of classical concepts in the quantum description hold
once we recognize that they are, so to speak, “produced” out of the quan-
tum formalism, which may thus be considered more fundamental? One may
suggest that this undermines the Copenhagen school’s insistence on the epis-
temological primacy of classical concepts. But since decoherence is simply a
consequence of a realistic application of the standard quantum formalism, it
cannot by itself give an interpretation or explanation of this formalism itself.
So the question remains, as it did before, whether it is possible to render
quantum mechanics as a meaningful theory about the world without the use
of classical concepts such as position and momentum (see Howard, 1994): In
so far as decoherence depends on the use of the quantum formalism, which
must itself be given a physical interpretation, some may suggest that the use
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of classical concepts has already been presupposed.
For example, part of the quantum formalism is usually derived through the
“quantization” of the classical position and momentum variables of single
particles, which then define configuration space as the preferred arena for the
wave function. In a similar manner, classical Hamiltonians (e.g., for the har-
monically bound particle) are directly “translated” into the operator-based
quantum picture. However, as Zeh (2003) has pointed out, quantum field
theory indicates that the only fundamental quantization required is at the
levels of (postulated) spatial fields, 7 while the concept of particles can then
be derived in terms of decoherence-induced (improper) ensembles of narrow
position-space wave packets (Zeh, 1993). 8 Thus, while it is clear that at some
stage of the theory we have to identify the physical entities to which the
mathematical formalism refers, these entities will not need to take the form
of familiar classical concepts such as particles and their positions.
Therefore any assessment of the extent to which decoherence allows us to “de-
rive classical concepts” must inevitably depend on their definition and the level
at which one demands an explanation of such concepts. Bohr and his followers
in the 1930s understood this as an epistemological, not a physical, condition
imposed on our description of nature, while (as we have seen) later followers of
Bohr sought to give the doctrine a more pragmatic, physical underpinning. 9
7 Somewhat misleadingly, this procedure is commonly referred to as the “second
quantization,” while the less fundamental quantization of particle positions and
momenta is denoted as the “first quantization.”
8 Early on, Heisenberg had contemplated the derivation of quantum mechanics and
particle-like structures from the quantization of fields in three-dimensional space.
This insight turned out to be particularly important for Heisenberg’s own under-
standing of wave–particle duality (Heisenberg, 1989, pp. 86, 93–4; Camilleri, 2006).
Heisenberg concluded that in this approach to quantum mechanics, the classical
concept of the field, not the particle, would constitute the fundamental starting
point.
9 More recently, physicists have attempted to redefine Bohr’s notion of comple-
mentarity in terms of entanglement (Bertet et al., 2001), while others now claim to
derive “the” Copenhagen interpretation from more fundamental principles (Ulfbeck
and Bohr, 2001). A Copenhagen-esque spirit may also be evident in the recent in-
terpretive stance that “quantum mechanics is about information” (see, e.g., Fuchs,
2002; Zeilinger, 2002; Bub, 2005). For example, Zeilinger suggests that “information
is the most basic notion of quantum mechanics, and it is information about possible
measurement results that is represented in the quantum states.Measurement results
are nothing more than states of the classical apparatus used by the experimentalist”
(Zeilinger, 2002, p. 252, emphasis in the original). The epistemological constraints
underlying Bohr’s doctrine of classical concepts are in information-based interpre-
tations often identified with limitations on the amount of information that nature
if willing to proliferate, thus motivating the view that quantum mechanics is, at
least in part, a theory about information. In this way, the quantum formalism may
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5 Conclusions
Decoherence allows us to analyze, in precise formal and quantitative terms
and wholly from within the quantum-mechanical formalism, when and how
the quantum-to-classical transition happens. It unambiguously specifies the
location of the Heisenberg cut and the conditions under which certain super-
position states—such as those of the Schro¨dinger-cat type—can be prepared
and observed, and what the lifetimes of such states will be in a given exper-
imental situation. It therefore explains, for example, why superpositions of
macroscopically distinct positions of a large object are so prohibitively dif-
ficult to prepare and maintain in practice. To our knowledge, there are no
experimental observations of quantum-to-classical processes that could not be
accounted for, at least in principle, by decoherence. 10
Decoherence thus provides a physical, quantitative underpinning of the quan-
tum–classical divide and the dynamics at this boundary. In doing so, it clar-
ifies the notion of the quantum–classical cut, which was at the center of the
disagreement between Bohr and Heisenberg in the 1930s. As we have seen,
Howard’s reconstruction of Bohr’s view of the classical-quantum divide not
only can help us make sense of the historical disagreement between Bohr and
Heisenberg, but also provides an important step in reconstructing the link be-
tween Bohr’s views and decoherence. It is rather clear that the application of
quantum mechanics along the entire chain of interacting systems (Einstein’s
“ganzer langer Weg,” as recalled by Heisenberg, 1971; see also Zeh, 2000),
including measurement devices and their environments, turned out to be a
key point in an understanding of the quantum-to-classical transition, ironi-
cally prominently involving the most distinctly quantum-mechanical features
of entanglement and unitary evolution. Although Bohr did not deny that in
principle such a fully quantum-mechanical treatment was possible, he con-
sidered it meaningless. He thereby closed himself, on grounds of a particular
philosophical stance, to the approach of subjecting the measurement process
to further quantum-mechanical analysis, in spite of the fact that he arguably
believed quantum theory to be universal.
As the insights brought about the study of decoherence show, Bohr’s atti-
be reconstructed (rather than interpreted) from fundamental assumptions about re-
strictions on the flow of information, expressed as information-theoretic principles
(see, e.g., the Clifton–Bub–Halvorson theorem; Clifton et al., 2003). For critical as-
sessments of such information-based interpretations, see, e.g., Hagar (2003); Hagar
and Hemmo (2006); Daumer et al. (2006); Shafiee et al. (2006).
10We emphasize that this statement is independent of any assessment of whether
and how decoherence may help solve the measurement problem, especially in the
sense of the “macro-objectification” problem (Jammer, 1974; Bassi and Ghirardi,
2000; Adler, 2003; Schlosshauer, 2004; Zurek, 2007).
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tude in this matter may be considered premature. It is worth noting that
Heisenberg’s writings in the 1950s appear to acknowledge that the quantum-
to-classical transition can be understood only if we bear in mind that the
system comprising the quantum object and the measuring apparatus is in re-
ality part of a bigger system, which ultimately encompasses the whole world.
Here it seems that Heisenberg went some way toward anticipating the results
of decoherence, although he never seems to have pursued the idea in any sys-
tematic fashion, and he never makes explicit the importance of entanglement
in the process.
If classical concepts are understood in the pragmatic sense—as something we
simply do use—decoherence suggests why this so. Decoherence shows that for
macroscopic systems, and thus any system that can legitimately count as a
measuring instrument capable of sufficiently amplifying measurement results
as to make them accessible to our experience, decoherence will be so strong as
to dynamically preclude most quantum states, save for those that turn out to
be precisely the (approximate) eigenstates of “classical” observables such as
position. Furthermore, information about such classical observables becomes
amplified through redundant encoding in the environment, thus meeting, at
least in an effective and relative-state state sense, Bohr’s criteria of “objecti-
fication” and “unambiguous communication” that seem so inherently wedded
to classical physics. In this sense, decoherence indeed allows us to formulate
classical concepts in physical terms: It not only tells us why the concepts
of classical physics are applicable in the macroscopic situations relevant to
our experience despite the underlying quantum-mechanical description of the
world, but also when and where these concepts can be applied.
On the other hand, it is much more difficult to provide a reasonably conclusive
answer to the question of whether decoherence suggests that Bohr’s assump-
tion of irreducible classical concepts as an epistemological, metatheoretical—
and thus ultimately philosophical—construct may be redundant. If classical
concepts are understood in Bohr’s imperative sense—as something we must
use—we still may invoke decoherence to justify this philosophical stance in a
practical sense. While decoherence allows us to identify dynamically created
classical structures and properties within the quantum formalism, of course
it does not—and cannot—in and of itself provide us with an answer to the
question of how to interpret this formalism, although it may lend additional
support to, or disqualify, certain interpretations (Schlosshauer, 2004). Bohr’s
fundamental point was that any interpretation of quantum mechanics must in
the end fall back on the use of classical concepts. In this sense one may suggest
that decoherence provides a physical justification for Bohr’s intuition. In fact,
Zurek (2003, 1998, 1993, 2005, 2007) locates his decoherence-based “existential
interpretation” between Bohr and Everett and relates it to a “neo-Copenhagen
strategy.” Such trends may further indicate that the possibility of a peaceful
coexistence between Bohr’s philosophy and decoherence could be considered
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more viable than it has previously often been claimed.
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